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样例:国营企业中的有效激励机制

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   高级经营管理者和核心技术骨干的行为在某种程度上讲决定着企业的命运。在我国的企业改革中，如何建立对高级经营管理者及核心技术骨干的有效激励-- 约束机制，使其经济利益与企业长远发展紧密联系起来，是理论界和企业界都相当关心的问题。中国国企改革效果有目共睹，但动力不足、约束无效的弊端并未从根本上得到解决，因此，迫切需要建立一种对经营者产生长期效果的激励机制。而股票期权计划正是这样的一种新型的激励机制，它可以把未来和当前的业绩、个人利益和公司的长期发展有机地结合起来。在国有企业实行ESO，也就是使经营者持股，可以使委托人和代理人的利益趋于一致，使经营者的工作业绩与经济利益直接相关，使其承担相应的资产责任，分享相应的资产利润，以使权利与责任、激励与约束相对称。本文试图通过对中外理论、实践的分析对比，对在中国实行ESO进行可行性分析，建立一套适用于国有企业的股票期权激励方案。基于上述目的，本文通过查阅大量中外文献，对国外实行ESO的基本理论、发展方向、实施要素、法律环境、出现的问题与弊端等进行了详细论述，对国外公司实施ESO的案例进行了介绍与分析。本文在对我国国有企业现状分析的基础上，论述了在国有企业实行ESO的重要意义，并通过实证研究，将我国现已设计或试行ESO的各个模式进行了分析、比较，对国有企业实行ESO的特点和面临的各种问题进行了总结。在最后一章，本文对设计实务中的重点要素进行了分析，并在上述分析研究的基础上，结合企业的实际情况，提出了一套适用于国有企业的股票期权激励方案，不仅对上市公司有很强的可操作性，对非上市公司也有一定的借鉴意义。

问题译文

    In some ways, the fate of an enterprise is determined by the behavior of its high-level managers and technical experts. How to build an incentive and restrained system that can bond individual benefits to the long-term development of an enterprise is a hot topic in academic and business. The reform of the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China has achieved remarkable success, but it has not solved the problem completely because of lacking impetus and restraint. Therefore, it is urgent to build an incentive mechanism, which can have permanent effects on employees. Executive Stock Options (ESO) plan is such a kind of incentive mechanism that can combine individual future fortune with his current performance, and also individual benefit with the long-term development of company. o run ESO in SOEs is to let employees hold shares so that both the consignor and the agent could benefit. In addition, it will connect employees" performance directly with their earnings, urge employees to take corresponding responsibility of common property, and make them share corresponding profit. Consequently, profit will be proportional to responsibility, and incentive and restraint will be balanced. By comparing related theories available in China and foreign countries, this paper analyzes the feasibility of the ESO plan in China, and tries to establish a ESO program suitable for SOEs in China. This paper discusses the basic theories, development directions, implementation components, legal environment problems and setbacks of ESO. Some cases of implementation of ESO in foreign countries are also introduced and analyzed. After having studied the status of SOEs in China, this paper illustrates the significance of implementation of ESO plan in SOEs. Based on the analysis and comparison of existing ESO models in China, the paper summarizes the characteristics and problems of implement ESO in SOEs. In the last chapter, this paper points out the key factors in designing program for ESO. According to the actual state of SOEs, the paper proposed an ESO program, which is suitable for SOEs. This program is not only operational to listed SOEs，but also useful for non-listed companies for reference.

修改后译文

    To some extent, the fate of an enterprise is dominated by the performance of its senior operating managers and technical experts. Both of the theory ＆ enterprise circles are very concerned about the following problem - how to build an incentive and constraint mechanism enable to connect the economic profit and the long-term development closely for the company . The reforms to the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China have achieved a remarkable success, but their disadvantages of insufficient impetus and ineffective constraint have not been solved thoroughly yet. Therefore, it is urgent to build an incentive mechanism, which can have long-term effects on operators. The Stock Option Plan (SOP) is such a kind of new-type incentive mechanism which is able to organically combine the following three (3) things together: ⅰthe future / current performance; ⅱthe individual profit; ⅲ the long-term development for the company. To run ESOs (Executive Stock Options) in SOEs is aimed to: ⅰ let operators there hold shares, which will finally result in an increasing uniform profit between the consignor and the agent ; ⅱ connect operators’ performance directly with their earnings, urge operators to take corresponding responsibilities on common property and make them share corresponding profit, which will consequently result in a balance between their rights and obligations, as well as the one between the incentive and the constraint. By comparing related theories available at home and aboard, this paper analyzes the feasibility to carry out the ESO plan in China and tries to establish an incentive ESO-related program suitable for SOEs in China. Additionally, in this paper, the basic theories, development directions, implementation components, legal environments, appearing problems and disadvan

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